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The Bankruptcy Reform Process: 
Maximizing Judicial Control in Wage Earners' Plans 
Marjorie Girth* 
Immediately after the 95th Congress convened in January 1977, a new 
version of legislation designed to accomplish a major revision of the 
Bankruptcy Act' was introduced in the House of Representatives. 2 This 
version was based upon reactions to earlier legislative proposals and 
suggestions submitted during extensive hearings held by the House 
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights 
during the 94th Congress. 3 Senate action on bankruptcy legislation was 
delayed by the implementation of an extensive committee reorganization 
plan. 4 As a result, the House legislation became the focus of attention for 
all interested parties in the new Congress. After extensive subcommittee 
markup sessions, the full Judiciary Committee overwhelmingly approved 
the legislation for House action. 5 
Discussions of earlier versions of the legislation had emphasized vary-
ing proposals for structuring the bankruptcy process. 6 The first recom-
mendation, known colloquially as the Brookings proposal, suggested that 
*Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. A.B. 1959, Mt. 
Holyoke; Ll..B. 1962, Harvard. Professor Girth is a co-author of the Brookings Institution 
study of bankruptcy administration. D. STANLEY AND M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, 
PRocEss, REFORM. Field research for this article was supported by a Baldy Summer 
Research Fellowship, awarded pursuant to the terms of the Christopher Baldy Fund of the 
State University of New York at Buffalo. The author is grateful for that support, as well as 
for a sabbatical leave which enabled her to prepare this article. Her colleagues, Daniel F. 
Gifford and John A. Spanogle, Jr., also provided very helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this work. Bankruptcy Judge Beryl McGuire, Robert T. Cryan, and John W. 
Creahan, the two Chapter XIII Trustees in Buffalo, and their staffs, allowed extensive 
observation of their practices and responded to the many questions which field research 
produces. Without their cooperation, this work would not have been possible. As always, 
final responsibility is the author's. 
I JJ U.S.C. §§ J-JJ03 (1970). 
2 H.R. 6, 95th Cong., !st Sess. (1977). 
3 Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3/ and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d 
Sess. (1975-1976) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act Revision]. Rep. Don Edwards, who 
chairs the subcommittee, had earlier served on the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the 
United States. See note 8 infra. 
• The Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machin-
ery had also held extensive hearings during the 94th Congress. The Bankruptcy Reform Act: 
Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machin-
ery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., !st & 2d Sess. (1975-1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as The Bankruptcy Reform Act]. Sen. Quentin Burdick, who had long chaired the 
subcommittee, moved to the Appropriations Committee as part of the reorganization. Sen. 
Dennis DeConcini was then appointed to chair the subcommittee, all of whose members 
were also new appointees. Letter from Robert E. Feidler of the subcommittee staff to the . 
author (April 19, 1977). 
5 The Judiciary Committee vote was 26-3. Wall St. J., July 20, 1977, at 2, col. 3. The 
reported legislation was substituted for the earlier version and became H.R. 8200, 95th 
Cong., !st Sess. (1977). Consideration of the Senate version of the legislation, introduced on 
October 31, 1977, is scheduled for 1978. S. 2266, 95th Cong., !st Sess. (1977). 
"See Girth, Prospects for Structural Reform of the Bankruptcy System, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 
1546 (1975). 
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an administrative agency process bankruptcy cases. 7 Such a structure 
would require the services of administrative law judges but would not 
continue the current bankruptcy courts. The Commission bil18 recom-
mended an administrative agency only for initial processing of all bank-
ruptcies, and proposed a new bankruptcy court to review agency deci-
. sions and serve as the initial trial forum for specified issues. 9 
The present bankruptcy judges10 wished to preserve their own status by 
retaining the present decisionmaking structure. The Judges' Bill, 11 drafted 
by representatives of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, 
presented an alternative proposal which maximized judicial control over 
the processing of bankruptcy cases. As a result, status politics· became 
very important as the House legislation evolved. 12 
This article examines the effort to maximize judicial control over the 
bankruptcy process and its impact on H.R. 8200's procedural require-
ments for the nonbusiness bankruptcy option known currently as the 
wage earners' plan. 13 As background, it describes the present nonbusi-
7 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 199-204 (1971). 
8 H.R. 10792 and S. 2565, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reintroduced as H.R. 31 and S. 
236, 94th Cong., !st Sess. (1975). This legislation resulted from the work of the Commission 
on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, authorized by Congress in 1970. Kennedy, 
Foreword: Bankruptcy Reform-1973, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 381-87 (1973). 
"Girth, supra note 6, at 1546, 1547-49. 
10 The referee in bankruptcy is usually the presiding officer, pursuant to § 22 of the 
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), and is to be called judge. RULES BANKR. PRoc. Rule 
901(7). [hereinafter cited as RULES] 
11 H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., !st Sess. (1975). 
12 Status concerns and economic self-interest coincide in the present bankruptcy judges' 
efforts. But status politics may also reflect self-defined perceptions of social worthiness, as 
the legislative activities of the American temperance movement reveal. J .R. GusFIELD, 
SYMBOLIC CRUSADE (1963). 
Another example of status politics in the bankruptcy reform process emerged in the effort 
to extend the terms and change the appointment process for judges in the reformed system. 
The Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill had agreed on a 15 year term for the new 
judgeships, but they differed significantly on the method of judicial appointment.§ 2-102(a) 
and (b), H.R. 31 and 32, 94th Cong., !st Sess. (1975). The 15 year term appeared to increase 
the status of present judges, whose appointments are for six years. However, the Commis-
sion Bill coupled the longer term with a Presidential appointment, requiring the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Such a proposal threatened to shift the political setting for such 
appointments away from the professional politics which dominate the present selection 
process by the United States district judges. Bankruptcy Act § 34(a), 11 U.S.C. § 62(a) 
(1970); D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 158-60. The judges' proposal attempted to 
retain the judicial influence, recommending selection by the judicial council within each 
circuit. 
H.R. 8200 proposed the creation of United States Bankruptcy Courts for each judicial 
district. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a) (1977). Judges appointed by the President, 
with the Senate's advice and consent, would serve during good behavior, i.e., for life, 
except in rare cases of professional misconduct. The power over appointments would shift 
to each state's Senators and away from the present district judges, who reportedly oppose 
dilution of their status by the creation of new bankruptcy courts. Their concerns are 
reflected by the U.S. Judicial Conference which has criticized the new system as "entirely 
unnecessary." Wall St. J. May 16, 1977, at 2, col. 3. The strength of this reaction was 
reflected in a 183-158 House vote on an amendment which rejected the proposed court 
system. Wall St. J., October 31, 1977, at 8, col. 2. House rules permit the issue to be 
reconsidered, and a later 262-146 vote approved the new court system. Wall St. J ., February 
2, 1978, at 8, col. 3. 
13 Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act,§§ 601-686, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1068 (1970). The 
comparable procedure in H.R. 8200 can be found at Chapter 13, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., !st 
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ness bankruptcy options and the statutory procedures for monitoring 
confirmed wage earners' plans. Then, using illustrative samples from 
three years of cases in the Buffalo region of the Western District of New 
York, it assesses whether present plans are being administered in accord-
ance with the statutory formalities. The economic incentives which affect 
creditors' behavior in taking advantage of their opportunities to monitor 
these proceedings are also examined. The article describes the proce-
dures ·which were developed for such cases in the Bankruptcy Rules and 
the legislative processes which produced H.R. 8200. Finally it assesses 
the consequences if status politics produces procedures which do not 
reflect accumulated experience. 
I. PRESENT BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURES 
A. Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Options 
For at least fourteen years, nonbusiness or personal cases administered 
under the Bankruptcy Act have constituted between eighty-five and 
ninety percent of the total caseload. 14 The present statute provides two 
basic options for nonbusiness debtors who cannot informally resolve 
problems with their creditors. In one procedure, known as straight bank-
ruptcy, the debtor's nonexempt assets15 are identified and converted into 
cash for payment to creditors. Straight bankruptcy has the advantage of 
providing the debtor with a discharge from all unsecured debts. 16 Only on 
very rare occasions does the debtor's prebankruptcy behavior give cred-
itors grounds for blocking the issuance of the discharge.17 A debtor who 
receives a discharge, however, cannot receive another unless the later 
bankruptcy petition is filed more than six years after the petition pursuant 
to which the discharge is granted. 18 
The other option is the Chapter XIII wage earners' plan, which focuses 
on the debtor's income instead of on nonexempt assets. Wage earners' 
plans have been used with widely varying frequency among the federal 
court districts but have consistently constituted sixteen to eighteen per-
cent of the nonbusiness bankruptcy filings during fiscal years 1972-76. 19 A 
Sess. §§ 1301-1331 (1977), providing for the "adjustment of debts of an individual with 
regular income." 
14 See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLES OF 
BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, Table F3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY 
STATISTICS,], for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976. See also earlier years. Business cases 
constitute the remaining 10 to 15%. For details on the business bankruptcies, see D. 
STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 107-17. 
15 At the present time, the Bankruptcy Act allows the exempt status of assets to be 
determined by state law. Bankruptcy Act, § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). These Jaws vary 
greatly in their treatment of debtors, but their typical effect in nonbusiness cases is to make 
very few nonexempt assets available for liquidation and payment to creditors. D. STANLEY 
& M. GIRTH, supra note 8, at 81-84. 
16 Straight bankruptcy has no effect on fully secured debt, because the creditor has the 
option of liquidating its collateral if the debtor defaults. Bankruptcy Act, § 57(h), 11 U .S.C. § 
93(h) (1970). 
17 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 90-91. 
18 Bankruptcy Act, § 14(c)(5), 11 U .S.C. § 32(c)(5) (i970). 
•• TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 14, at Tables F2 and F3. 
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debtor who selects this option proposes to pay all or part of his or her 
debts over an extended period of time. If creditors agree to the proposal, 
the plan is confirmed by the bankruptcy judge and payments begin. 20 
A wage earners' plan may be an attractive option to debtors and their 
creditors for a number of reasons. Many debtors wish to meet their 
obligations and to avoid what they perceive to be the stigma of bank-
ruptcy. 21 Nonbusiness debtors who reaffirm a substantial proportion of 
their unsecured debts after receiving a straight bankruptcy discharge find 
that the discharge is of limited value. 22 The wage earners' plan may 
benefit unsecured creditors by producing more payments than if the 
debtor had chosen straight bankruptcy23 and by offering more equitable 
treatment than if the creditor's claim had been among those not reaffirmed 
arter a straight bankruptcy proceeding. In addition, the straight bank-
ruptcy discharge remains available to a debtor who has fully paid all 
creditors pursuant to a wage earners' plan, if financial problems recur. 
After the court confirms a wage earners' plan, the present Bankruptcy 
Act and Rules24 provide formal procedures for modifications. "Any party 
in interest," usually the debtor, 25 may request a change in the amount of 
payments or the time period for the plan. Upon receiving the request, the 
court must give notice to interested parties and hold a hearing26 before 
reaching a decision. If the court denies the request for modification and 
the debtor is unable to meet the requirements of the confirmed plan, 
several options are available. The debtor can request a discharge if three 
years have elapsed and the failure to complete the plan is caused by 
circumstances beyond his or her control. 27 Creditors must be given the 
opportunity to object to the discharge before it is granted by the court. If 
the required three years have not elapsed, the court can dismiss the 
proceeding or, with the debtor's consent, adjudicate him or her a bank-
rupt. 28 Once a case is dismissed, creditors are free to pursue the debtor 
for payment of the remaining amounts owing to them. A debtor in a wage 
eamers's proceeding may be adjudicated a bankrupt without his or her 
consent if the petition was originally filed as a straight bankruptcy and 
later converted to a wage earners' plan. If adjudication occurs, 
nonexempt assets are liquidated and distribution is made pursuant to 
2° For confirmation of a plan, Chapter XIII .requires the consent of a majority in number 
and amount of the unsecured creditors and of all secured creditors who are affected by the 
plan. Bankruptcy Act,§ 652(1), 11 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1970). Allegedly secured claims must 
therefore be examined very closely in the effort to devise feasible plans for such debtors. If 
the secured status is not validly perfected or the value of the collateral is less than the 
amount of the claim, it will be wholly or partially unsecured. 
21 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 65-69, 230-32. 
22 H. JACOB, DEBTORS IN COURT 109-10 (1969); D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 
59-62. 
23 In at least 84% of the nonbusiness straight bankruptcies, unsecured creditors received 
nothing; in the remaining cases, they received only seven cents on the dollar. D. STANLEY & 
M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 87, 93. 
24 See Section II A, infra, for a discussion of the development of the Rules. 
25 RULE 13-214(a), modifying Bankruptcy Act § 646(5), 11 U .S.C. § 1046(5) (1970). 
2s Id. 
27 Bankruptcy Act,§ 661, II u.s.c. § 1061 (1970) and RULE 13-404(b). 
28 RULE 13-215(a), modifying Bankruptcy Act §666, 11 U .S.C. § 1066 (1970). 
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straight bankruptcy procedures. Dismissal or adjudication can be re-
quested either by the debtor or by any other interested party. 29 
B. Case Study of Present Administration of Wage Earners' Plans 
In order to compare the actual administration of wage earners' plans 
with the statute's procedural requirements, a random sample was initially 
drawn from Chapter XIII cases filed in fiscal year 1971 with the bank-
ruptcy judge in the Buffalo office of the Western District of New York. 30 
The results of an examination of these records can illustrate administra-
tive practices in the Buffalo area but may not represent the experience of 
the nation as a whole. However, the Buffalo statistics are consistent with 
information from seven diverse districts concerning two preliminary is-
sues: the financial profiles of the debtors31 and the importance of the 
bankruptcy judge's receptivity to efforts to use wage earners' plans. 32 
The debtors' financial profiles may indicate their ability to complete a 
confirmed plan without subsequent modifications. 33 The judge's attitude 
affects not only the initial choice of the wage earners' plan but also his 
reactions to problems arising in the debtor's performance under the plan. 
29 Id. 
30 This phase of the research was assisted by David Klein, J.D., 1972, State U. ofN.Y. at 
Buffalo, with the support of the Jaeckle-Abrams Fund for student assistance, Faculty of 
Law and J urisprudt;nce, State U. of N. Y. at Buffalo. Officially reported data on such cases 
do not include the details of case administration which are crucial to this comparison, but are 
limited to numbers of cases filed and closed, the amounts of creditors' claims, and the 
amounts distributed. 
31 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 43; see also other studies cited therein. 
32 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 94-105. 
33 In this study, blue collar workers with low incomes predominated: 
Type of Employment 
Semiskilled or unskilled 
Craftsmen or skilledb 
Professionals or Semiprofessionalsc 
Sales 
Clerical 
Service 
Proprietors and Managers 
Others or Unknown 
Fiscal Year of Filing• 
1971 1973 1975 
55% 49% 40% 
12.5% 24.4% 19% 
10% 2% 14.2% 
7.5% 2% 2.4% 
5% 14.2% 9.5% 
5% 6.1% 2.4% 
2.0% 4.8% 
5% 7.1% 
a For fiscal year 1971, N = 40 cases; for fiscal 1973, 49 cases; for fiscal 1975, 42 cases. 
b Job descriptions in the files were often not precise. Doubts about the distinction 
between the semiskilled and skilled categories were resolved in favor of classifying 
the petitioner as skilled. 
c Usually public employees, such as police or corrections officers, or deputy sheriffs. 
For fiscal 1971, the median take-home pay was $6,250; for fiscal 1973, $6,750; and for fiscal 
1975. $7.250. The petitioners were obviously heavily indebted at the time they filed: 
Scheduled Indebtedness as Percent of Take-Home Pay 
1971 1973 1975 
Median .......... · .. · · .. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 65% 65% 55% 
Low . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15% 15% 25% 
High . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200% 165% 185% 
For fiscal 1971 and 1973, the median scheduled indebtedness was $4,250; for fiscal 1975, 
$4,750. 
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Wage earners' plans had rarely been used in the Buffalo area of the 
Western District of New York when Judge Beryl McGuire was appointed 
in April 1968. 34 After acquiring experience in administering nonbusiness 
straight bankruptcy cases, Judge McGuire decided that wage earners' 
plans should be more widely considered because of the repayment poten-
tial which they offered. He launched an educational effort aimed at the 
practicing bar and at creditors, appointed a standing trustee for all such 
cases, 35 and made arrangements to utilize a computerized service for 
maintaining case records and handling disbursements. In combination, 
these decisions resulted in a rapid increase in filing and disbursements to 
creditors, as well as in accumulated cases pending at the end of succes-
sive fiscal years. 36 
Fiscal year 1971 37 was chosen for the initial sample because it was the 
first full year of experience with Judge McGuire's efforts to encourage the 
wage earners' plan as a nonbusiness bankruptcy option and because the 
Buffalo labor area experienced a sharp increase in unemployment shortly 
thereafter. 38 Earlier research had supported a predictable relationship 
between overall bankruptcy filings and the state of the economy. 39 The 
1971 sample was selected so that debtors' progress under difficult em-
ployment conditions could be monitored in order to allow more precise 
analysis of the relationship between unemployment conditions and an 
ability to complete wage earners' plans successfully. It was hypothesized 
that unemployment would make completion of the wage earners' plans 
34 Ten wage earners' plans were filed in fiscal 1965; 10 in fiscal 1966; 7 in fiscal 1967; 2 in 
fiscal 1968; and 3 in fiscal 1969. Letter from the staff of Judge Beryl McGuire to the author 
(November 10, 1976). 
35 The first standing Chapter XIII trustee was appointed on November 25, 1969. When his 
caseload became too great, a second standing trustee was added on October I, 1974. These 
appointments provided the court with in-house experts who could answer attorneys' and 
creditors' inquiries, in addition to monitoring debtors' performance under their plans. 
36 Annual reports filed by Judge McGuire and the Chapter XIII trustees with the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts indicate that for fiscal years 1970-75, the respec-
tive data were as follows: 
FY 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Cases Filed• 
49 
280 
301 
368 
541 
1059 
Cases Pending• 
49 
292 
586 
869 
1386 
2072 
Disbursements to Creditors 
$ 54 
$ 101,117 
$ 351,823 
$ 643,754 
$ 933,084 
$1,206,114 
a Understates the number of individuals involved, because spouses' cases 
were consolidated for purposes of administration. 
37 When this research was conducted, the federal government's fiscal year ran from July I 
to June 30, with the fiscal year identified by its final month. Thus, cases for fiscal year 1971 
were filed as early as July I, 1970. 
38 Unemployment in the area rose to an annual average of9.3% in fiscal 1972 from 6.3% in 
fiscal·l971. For fiscal 1973 and 1974, it declined to an annual average of 7.6% and 7.9% 
respectively, before rising sharply again to 10.3% in fiscal 1975. Information provided by 
George P. Smyntek, Senior Economist, New York State Department of Labor (June 24, 
1976). 
39 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 27-28. 
FALL 1977] Bankruptcy Reform 57 
difficult for the debtors, thereby causing either the debtor or creditors to 
move to modify or terminate the plans. 40 
The Bankruptcy Act contemplates a maximum of three years for per-
formance under wage earners' plans by allowing the debtor to seek a 
discharge thereafter if the failure to complete the payments is due to 
circumstances beyond his or her control.41 The fiscal 1971 sample was 
therefore reexamined in the summer of 1975. By that time all of the 
sample cases had been filed at least four years earlier, 42 and, even allow-
ing for some delays, all might have been expected to be closed. Instead, 
thirty percent of the sample cases were still open. The open cases faced a 
median repayment period of six years, with the longest repayment period 
scheduled for eleven years. Closer examination of these cases revealed 
that debtors were not asking for the section 661 discharge; creditors were 
neither objecting to missed payments nor filing motions to dismiss the 
payment plans; and, as a result, no hearings were being held on the 
modifications which resulted from missed payments. 43 The standing 
trustee was holding the cases open as long as he was able to contact the 
debtor and there was some prospect of future repayment. 44 
In order to test whether the 1971 sample was unique and not representa-
tive of later experience in Buffalo wage earners' plans, samples were then 
drawn from fiscal years 1973 and 1975. The later samples confirmed the 
fact that the experience of the 1971 cases was typical for this geographical 
area. The combination of debtors who wished to pay their debts, a judge 
who was willing to let them try, and creditors who had less to los.e by 
waiting than by forcing the debtor out of the wage earners' proceeding, 
produced cases which stayed open as long as any hope of payment 
remained. 45 Termination of wage earners' plans was not affected either by 
temporary unemployment or by Bankruptcy Act procedures. 
Unemployment may have had an effect upon the amounts which debt-
ors proposed to repay. All of the debtors in the 1971 sample had proposed 
100% payment of their debts. In fiscal 1973, there were a few exceptions 
to this pattern, but by fiscal 1975 partial repayments were proposed by 
more than one-third of the sample's debtors. 46 
40 Bankruptcy Act, § 646(5), 11 U.S.C. § 1046(5) (1970) and RULE 13-214; Bankruptcy 
Act, § 666, 11 U .S.C. § 1066 (1970) and RULE 13-215. 
41 Bankruptcy Act, § 661, 11 u .s.c. § 1061 (1970) and RULE 13-404(b). 
42 Not later than June 30, 1971. 
43 See text accompanying notes 24-29 supra. 
44 Some payments were even received from debtors who had long since moved out of the 
state. 
45 At this stage the creditors' cost would be limited to whatever personnel expense was 
involved in monitoring an account which remained open to receive an occasional payment. 
46 A wage earner's plan does not require full payment of scheduled debts, because a plan 
can be confirmed at any repayment level which creditors will accept. The United States 
Supreme Court has held that partial repayment plans have the same effect as a straight 
bankruptcy discharge, however. A debtor who chooses partial repayment could be faced 
with an objection to a later discharge if another petition were filed within six years. Perry v. 
Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966); note 18 supra. 
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Percent to be paid 
100% 
75% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
25% 
Journal of Law Reform 
1971 
100% 
1973 
95.9% 
4.1% 
[VoL. 11:51 
1975 
64.3% 
2.4% 
2.4% 
2.4% 
23.8% 
2.4% 
2.4% 
Debtors' attorneys reported that the increasing use of partial repay-
ments resulted from a combination of economic realities affecting the 
debtors and lawyers' accumulated experience with wage earners' plans. 
The attorneys described these debtors as people with very heavy debt 
loads who attempted to ride out the inflationary recession with borrow-
ing. Although debtors often wished to pay 100%, their attorneys some-
times suggested paying less, because they believed that Judge McGuire 
would not confirm a proposed plan which would run for more than three 
to five years. Attorp.eys were initially hesitant to propose less than 100% 
repayment, because the educational effort aimed at creditors had stressed 
the potential for full repayment with wage earners' plans. Accumulated 
experience revealed, however, that creditors would cooperate with par-
tial repayment plans, because "anything they get is better than noth-
ing. "47 
A final review of all three samples occurred in June, 1976. Table I 
shows their status as of that time. 
TABLE I 
Percentage of Sample Cases Completed, Dismissed, Adjudicated, 
and Pending as of June, 1976, by Fiscal Years 
1971 1973 1975 
Successfully Completed 47.5% 26.5%3 
Dismissed 27.5% 20.5% 1 l.9%b 
Adjudicated 5.0% 10.2% 9.5%b 
Pending 20.0% 42.8% 78.6% 
a Includes 4 percent which were granted § 661 discharges and 4 
percent which had proposed 70 percent plans. 
b Includes 2.4 percent which were proposed as 50 percent plans. 
Substantial percentages of the 1971 and 1973 samples remained pending, 
although the 1971 cases could have been filed for as long as six years and 
the 1973 cases for as long as four years. 48 Cases in the 1975 sample had 
been pending for as long as two years, and although some of these cases 
had been dismissed or adjudicated into straight bankruptcy, 49 none had as 
yet been successfully completed. For each sample, Table II shows the 
median time which elapsed before termination of the case. 
41 Confidential interviews with lawyers who represent Chapter XIII petitioners in the 
Buffalo Region of the Western District of New York (August 1976). 
48 The earliest filings occurred in July 1970, and July 1972 respectively. 
49 See notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra. 
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TABLE II 
Median Number of Months from Filing to Completion, 
Dismissal, and Adjudication, as of June, 1976, by Fiscal Years 
1971 8 
Successful completion 44 
Low 26 
High 53 
Dismissal 38 
Low II 
High 62 
Adjudication 21 
Low 20 
High 23 
aFiled for a maximum of 72 months in June, 1976. 
bFiled for a maximum of 48 months in June, 1976. 
cFiled for a maximum of 24 mon.ths in June, 1976. 
197l 
32 
II 
41 
32 
14 
38 
14 
5 
35 
8 
9 
5 
17 
8 
II 
59 
When compared with the three-year period for eligibility for a section 661 
discharge, maximum time periods exceeding four or five years suggest 
substantial tolerance for delays in the debtors' attempted performance. 
The existence of these delays was confirmed by observation of the trust-
ees' operations. The statute's requirements for formal hearings on any 
modification of a confirmed plan50 were being ignored, apparently be-
cause creditors had nothing to gain by either dismissal or adjudication. 
Instead of moving for prompt dismissal when defaults occurred, creditors 
allowed cases to be held open as long as any prospect of payment 
remained and relied on the trustees' judgment to decide when further 
hope was fruitless. 
The reasons supporting a trustee's judgment that a particular case had 
no further potential were rarely explicit in the case files. The Buffalo 
trustees make most of their contacts by telephone and detailed written 
records of their conversations are not made. Ordinarily, if the debtor 
cannot be contacted or if the trustee decides after discussing the situation 
with the debtor that no more payments can be expected, he simply files a 
motion to dismiss the proceeding,51 citing insufficient payments. 52 Cred-
itors have no reason to object unless they know of sources of income 
which the debtor has failed to disclose to the trustee. No record of such 
objections appeared in these files. Similarly, the files often do not reveal 
the reasons for the decision to convert a wage earners' plan to a straight 
bankruptcy proceeding. Explanations which were noted include belated 
so Bankruptcy Act, § 646(5), II u.s.c. § 1046(5) (1970) and RULE 13-214. 
51 Bankruptcy Act, § 666, 11 U.S.C. § 1066 (1970) and RULE 13-215(a). 
52 This description is based upon the author's observation of the Chapter XIII trustees' 
behavior and subsequent discussions with them concerning their procedures. 
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recognition of how difficult it would be to meet the obligations of the plan, 
illness, and layoff or reduced income. 53 
The extent of creditors' tolerance became even clearer when a com-
parison was made of the status of pending cases in both July 1975, and 
June 1976. As of June 1976, the median projected completion time for 
pending cases in fiscal 1971 was eighty-seven months; for fiscal 1973, 
fifty-six months; and for fiscal 1975, forty-seven months. 54 For individual 
cases from the 1971 sample, the median slippage in projected completion 
time between July 1975, and June 1976, was eight months. 55 For example, 
the median pending case had been projected as of July 1975, to close in 
January 1983. By June of 1976, however, it was expected to remain open 
until September 1983. Obviously, payments in the interim were erratic, 
and the estimated payment period of twelve years between filing in 1971 
and the projected completion in 1983 could be extended further. In the 
1973 sample, the median slippage was two months, 56 and in the 1975 
sample, there was a median gain of one month in projected completion. 
For this latest sam·ple, changes in completion dates were dramatic, rang-
ing from a gain of fifty months when scheduled creditors failed to file 
claims to a loss of forty-five months when unscheduled creditors filed. 
Since the files disclosed no evidence that creditors monitored these 
cases after confirmation, it is unlikely that they were aware of such 
dramatic changes in the likelihood of repayment. Instead they enjoyed the 
benefits of a low-cost collection service, 57 often facilitated by direct, 
53 Because of the availability of dismissal or adjudication and because a discharge in 
straight bankruptcy affects only unsecured claims, wage earners' plans are open to abuse by 
debtors whose goal is only to protect their interests in property subject to valid security 
interests. A debtor who files a straight bankruptcy petition risks losing property which 
served as collateral for validly secured creditors. Under a wage earner's plan, secured 
creditors may be restrained from proceeding to recover their collateral if the bankruptcy 
judge finds that their interests are protected and that such behavior would jeopardize the 
plan. Bankruptcy Act,§§ 614, 652, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1014, 1052 (1970), RULES 13-401 and 13-212. 
Under the wage earners' plans administered in Buffalo, secured creditors are paid in full 
before unsecured creditors receive any payments. Debtors might therefore pay their secured 
creditors in full and immediately either seek adjudication or allow dismissal to occur. The 
three samples each included instances of full payment to secured creditors followed by 
defaults in the plans. But the frequency of such occurrences was so low (12.5% in FY 1971; 
12.2% in FY 1973; 2.4% in FY 1975) that it does not support a thesis of widespread 
manipulation of the procedures. 
54 The 1975 figure is obviously lower than it would have been if the earlier pattern of 
confirming all plans for 100% payment had been continued. See note 46 and accompanying 
text supra. 
55 Ranging from a gain of two months to a loss of seventeen months. 
56 Ranging from a gain of two months to a loss of fourteen months. 
57 When these samples were examined for the last time in June 1976, the median amounts 
paid to creditors in closed cases were consistent with the variations in the proposed plans. 
Successfully completed ................ . 
Dismissed ............................ . 
Adjudicated ........................... . 
1971 
$4250 
1750 
2750 
1973 
$3250 
1250 
500 
1975 
$ 500 
1000 
For successfully completed cases in the 1971 sample, the median payments equalled the 
median scheduled debts, a result which reflected the fact that confirmed plans in that year 
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court-ordered payments of salary deductions by the debtor's employer. 
Whether these results were intended by the original statutory drafters 
may no longer be important. The proposed statutory revisions to the 
Bankruptcy Act should be evaluated, however, to determine whether 
they reflect this accumulated experience. 
II. REFORM EFFORTS 
A. The Bankruptcy Rules 
The work of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the 
Judicial Conference provided the first opportunity to incorporate experi-
ence with wage earners' plans into bankruptcy procedures. The Commit-
tee began the painstaking rule-drafting process after authorizing legisla-
tion was passed in 1964,58 and the Chapter XIII Rules became effective 
October l, 1973.59 
Several factors combined to produce rules which had a minimal effect 
upon the extent of judicial control over wage earners' plans. Since the 
Bankruptcy Rules may affect only procedural matters, 60 it would have 
been inappropriate for the Advisory Committee to undertake basic sub-
stantive reforms. Commentators have noted that the Chief Reporter, 
Professor Frank Kennedy of the University of Michigan, was careful not 
to overstep the jurisdictional limits of his task. 61 Insofar as the proposed 
rules affected wage earners' plans, this professional conservatism was 
reinforced by two other important factors. First, the proposed rules 
affecting straight bankruptcy proceedings had been previously issued for 
comments, and the Chapter XIII Rules were closely correlated with the 
consistently required 100% payment. For the 1973 sample, the median successfully com-
pleted case totalled only $3250, but almost one-third of these cases had either proposed 70% 
plans or received § 661 discharges. In all three samples, the payments in dismissed and 
adjudicated cases were small, as debtors failed to meet their obligations under confirmed 
plans. 
58 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970). The Committee was established in 1960 and initially gave 
priority to. a revision of the General Orders and official bankruptcy forms. Advisory Com-
mittee's Introductory Note to the Preliminary Draft to the Bankruptcy Rules, reprinted in 
COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND RULES 751 (1975). 
59 BANKR. R. & OFFICIAL BANKR. FORMS, 415 U.S. 1003 (1973). 
60 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1975). Reported litigation challenging the substantive nature of the 
rules for Chapter XIII has thus far involved only RULE 13-307(d). That rule allows the court 
to value the collateral in allegedly secured claims as of the date of the petition. United States 
district courts have split on the nature of the rule. Compare In re Moralez, 400 F. Supp. 1352 
(N.D. Cal. 1975) (holding it invalid) with In re Wall, 403 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Ark. 1975) and 
In re McKee. 416 F. Supp. 652, (E.D. Ark. 1976) (sustaining its validity). Other cases have 
considered the same issue indirectly. See In re Garcia. 396 F. Supp. 518 (C.D. Cal. 1974); In 
re Cassidy, 401 F. Supp. 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Countryman, Partially Secured 
Creditors Under Chapter XIII, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269 (1976). 
61 Cyr, The Abandonment of the Judicial Administration of Insolvency Proceedings: A 
Commitment to Consumer Disservice, 78 COM. L.J. 37, 38 (1973); Landers, The New 
Bankruptcy Rules: Relics of the Past as Fixtures of the Future. 57 MINN. L. REV. 827, 835 
(1973). Professor Kennedy later became Executive Director of the Commission on Bank-
ruptcy Laws of the United States. The Commission's jurisdiction did include substantive 
matters. See note 8 supra. 
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earlier provisions. 62 Second, none of the participants in the rule-drafting 
process had substantial experience with the administration of wage ear-
ners' plans. Practicing professionals, particularly bankruptcy judges with 
Chapter XIII experience, were consulted in an attempt to remedy this 
deficiency. 63 It is suggested, however, that these sources were unlikely to 
propose reforms reducing their own roles in the administration of wage 
earners' plans. 
The Advisory Committee did take some steps to remove judges from 
the detailed administration of wage earners' plans64 and to reduce the 
number of required hearings. 65 The Chapter XIII Rules also recognized 
some of the distinctions between straight bankruptcy cases, which focus 
on the liquidation of nonexempt assests, and wage earners' plans, which 
rely upon payments from future income.66 
Despite the recognition of some differences, the basic setting for admin-
istration of wage earners' plans under the rules remained adversarial,67 
and subsequent amendments have not affected the provisions which 
mandate adversary procedures. 68 An adversary setting maximizes judicial 
control, because it is based upon the theory thatjudicial decisions will be 
necessary to resolve contested issues in these cases. A study of the 
sample cases from Buffalo reveals that in practice creditors will waive 
almost all their opportunities for participation. The basic creditors' rights 
waived in the Buffalo cases were the right to contest modifications before 
confirmation;69 the right to participate in a confirmation hearing;70 the 
62 Preliminary Draft on Proposed Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms under Chapter 
XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, xvi, xviii (September 1971). The Associate Reporter of the ch. 
XIII ru.les was Professor Vern Countryman of Harvard University. 
63 Countryman, New Rules for Chapter XIII, 46 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129, 130 (1972). 
64 E.g., RULE 13-202(a), which provides that a creditor who does not object to the 
proposed plan is deemed to have accepted it; RuLE 13-307(b), which provides that unse-
cured claims which are proved be deemed allowed unless an objection is made; and RULE 
13-603(b), a provision which has the effect of eliminating the requirement that the judge 
countersign dividend checks. 
65 RULE 13-204(a) allows confirmation of the proposed payment plan at the first meeting of 
creditors. 
66 The emphasis on payments from income is reflected in RULE 13-111, which authorizes 
spouses to file a joint petition and to have joint administration; RULE 13-403, which relieves 
the trustee of the necessity of setting aside exemptions in these cases, requiring only that the 
debtor claim his exemptions in the event that a straight bankruptcy conversion follows; and 
RULE 13-402(3), which relieves the trustees of the need to file a statement of executory 
contracts in every case, retaining the requirement only that the debtor file such a statement 
when required to do so by the court. 
67 RULE 13-701. 
68 Amendments effective on August 1, 1976, affected other significant interests. See RULE 
13-302, a provision requiring that allegedly secured creditors file their proofs of claim before 
the conclusion of the first meeting of creditors, so that confirmation and distribution to all 
creditors could proceed without delay; RULE 13-304, a provision allowing co-debtors to file a 
proof of claim on behalf of their creditors, thereby permitting distribution to the creditor and 
providing an incentive to delay collection from the co-debtor; and RULE 13-3.05, a provision 
which allows creditors to add claims which were incurred after the debtor filed the wage 
earners' proceeding if they were for taxes or for "property or services needed to assure 
proper performance under the plan." 
69 RULE 13-212. 
70 RULE 13-213. 
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right to object to modifications after confirmation; 71 the right to object to 
dismissals or conversion to straight bankruptcy proceedings; 72 and the 
right to object to a discharge for failure to complete the payments of the 
plan. 73 
The combination of such waivers in actual cases provides a striking 
divergence from the statutory theory of creditor control and monitoring of 
wage earners' plans in an adversary context. The rules failed to reflect 
this experience, but a second opportunity to utilize it arose during revi-
sion of the bankruptcy legislation. 
B. Legislative Developments 
The Chapter XIII Rules became effective contemporaneously with the 
introduction of legislation resulting from the report of the Presidential 
Commission on bankruptcy laws. 74 In the Commission Bill, the proce-
dures for wage earners' plans appeared in Chapter VI, which provided 
plans for "debtors with regular income. " 75 The Judges' Bill contained a 
similar proposal, 76 which also reflected a decision to conform the Chapter 
to the procedures required under the rules. 77 The existence of the Chapter 
XIII Rules had a restrictive effect on the reform proposals which the 
judges were willing to consider, just as the existence of the straight 
bankruptcy rules restricted the work of those who drafted the Chapter 
XIII Rules. 78 These limitations were reinforced by the professional con-
servatism of those who had a continuing impact on the developing legisla-
tion. 79 
Late in the congressional hearings process, the National Bankruptcy 
Conference presented its proposed revisions of the pending bills to the 
House and Senate Judiciary Subcommittees. 80 Subsequently, committees 
representing the Judges and the Conference were established to work out 
their continuing differences of opinion. The resulting reports were for-
warded informally to the House and Senate committees so that their staffs 
could have the benefit of the outcome of the negotiating process while 
71 RULE 13-214. 
72 RULE 13-215. 
73 RULE 13-404. 
74 See note 8 supra. 
75 The proposed Chapter VI coverage was broader than that presently authorized under 
Chapter XIII, which is limited to a petitioner "whose principal income is derived from 
wages, salary or commissions." Bankruptcy Act, § 606(8), 11 U .S.C. § 1006(8) (1970). 
76 H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 6-101 to 6-701 (1975). 
77 Synopsis of the bankruptcy legislation prepared by the National Conference of Bank-
ruptcy Judges, mimeo, undated, p. 14. 
78 See text accompanying note 62, supra. Professor Landers had earlier predicted that 
those who drafted legislation might be reluctant to make the work of the Rules Committee 
superfluous. Landers, supra note 61, at 25. 
79 By this time, the Commission had completed its work and gone out of existence. The 
primary groups remaining were the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges and the 
National Bankruptcy Conference, whose members are present and former bankruptcy 
judges, law professors, and prominent bankruptcy practitioners. 
80 The Bankruptcy Act of 1975, reprinted in Bankruptcy Act Revision, Appendix, supra 
note 3, at 333-91. 
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working on legislative revisions. 81 If the legislation82 ultimately enacted 
as part of the overall bankruptcy law revisions incorporates the results of 
these reports, confirmed plans for debtors with regular income could be 
administered much as they have been in the past. 
Initially, commentators and witnesses testifying at the hearings gave 
comparatively little attention to the specific legislative proposals for hand-
ling the present wage earners' plans in the Commission Bill and the 
Judges' Bill. 83 Two preliminary issues relating to lawyers' and judges' 
status and affecting all bankruptcy petitioners did draw considerable 
attention: first, the degree of assistance which petitioners would receive 
from the bankruptcy system in choosing between the alternative remedies 
of straight bankruptcy and plans for debtors with regular income; and, 
secondly, the proper location for filing all bankruptcy petitions. 
The issue of how to provide petitioners with help in choosing among 
nonbusiness bankruptcy alternatives threatened both the view that pri-
vate debtors' counsel were essential and the possibility that judges' pref-
erences would affect that choice. The Commission Bill provided that 
bankruptcy petitions would be filed without making a choice between 
alternatives. Once having filed, the debtor would be advised about the 
existence of alternatives by agency staff. 84 This recommendation resulted 
from the Commission's finding that the preference of judges and debtors' 
counsel played a significant role in the very uneven use of wage earners' 
plans throughout the country. 85 
The Commission's proposal caused concern about whether personnel 
in the agency with responsibility for ultimately administering the case 
should also be providing advice about options. 86 It was also argued that 
the agency might develop a bias in favor of either of the two alternatives, 
even if the problems concerning confidentiality and conflict of interest 
could be resolved. 87 These concerns were reflected in the Judges' Bill, 
which limited assistance by administrative staff to the preparation of the 
petition and the schedules which reflect indebtedness. 88 By eliminating 
agency staff, H.R. 8200 leaves advice about statutory options exclusively 
to the private bar. 
81 Letter to the Conferees from Charles A. Horsky, Chairman of the National Bankruptcy 
Conference (June 24, 1976). 
82 See H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
83 These procedures appeared as Chapter VI of the earlier legislative proposals, but they 
appear as Chapter 13 in H.R. 8200. See note 75 and accompanying text supra. 
84 H.R. 31 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-203 (1975). 
85 COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT, Part [, 
157-60 (!973), which confirmed data in D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 74-76. 
Testimony of Professor Frank Kennedy, Executive Director of the Commission, Bank-
ruptcy Act Revision, Part I, supra note 3. at 167-68; The Bankruptcy Reform Act, Part I, 
supra, note 4, at 23. 
86 Some witnesses before the congressional committees testified that an agency system 
could be structured to segregate responsibilities and to protect petitioners from the possibil-
ity of inappropriate disclosure of information concerning discussions of options. Bankruptcy 
Act Revision, Part I, supra note 3, at 182-83, 367-68, 542, and 588. Others felt that adequate 
protection for petitioners would be impossible. Id. at 609-10, 905-06, and 953. 
87 Id. at 571-72, 948-49, and 953. 
88 H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-203 (1975). 
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A provision that bankruptcy petitions be filed with an administrative 
agency89 would have reduced the importance of the judicial role from the 
outset of the bankruptcy proceeding. 90 This threat to judicial status has 
also been eliminated by H.R. 8200, which retains a judicially controlled 
setting for bankruptcy cases. 91 The implications of that basic decision are 
evident in the treatment in H.R. 8200 of the procedural steps which were 
crucial to the administration of wage earners' plans in the Buffalo sam-
ples. H.R. 8200 assigns the highest priority to the maintenance of judicial 
control, although the legislation does recognize some of the economic 
realities which creditors face. For example, at the time a payment plan is 
confirmed, judicial control is maintained by requiring a hearing for con-
firmation. 92 One of the conditions for confirmation, however, is a judicial 
finding that unsecured creditors will not receive less than a straight 
bankruptcy liquidation would have produced.93 Recognizing that unse-
cured creditors have less to lose if such payments are possible,94 the 
statute does not require them to file formal acceptances to these plans. 
In contrast, for modifications after confirmation, which were most 
crucial to the effective conclusion of plans in the Buffalo samples, H.R. 
8200 ignores the economic realities for creditors while maintaining for-
malities which are consistent with continued judicial control. The data in 
the Buffalo samples indicate that debtors in wage earners' plans often 
need postconfirmation modifications because of layoffs, illness, or other 
unforeseen circumstances.95 When these requests are made, the statute 
allows the trustee to proceed only "after notice and a hearing, " 96 a 
procedure which appears to involve the judge in each modification; how-
ever, the statute limits these requirements to appropriate notice and an 
89 Both the Commission bill and the National Bankruptcy Conference version of the 
legislation recommended this approach; the Judges' Bill retained filing with a court. The 
provision is § 4-202(b) in all versions. 
90 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act Revision, Part I, supra note 3, at 533-34 and 628-29. 
Testimony at the congressional hearings focused indirectly on this status issue, with oppo-
nents of the agency alleging that filing with an agency would encourage debtors to resort to 
bankruptcy. Id. at 20, 570-71, 906, 1018-19, and 1045. 
91 See notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra. 
92 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1324 (1977). The Commission bill would have 
authorized the administrator to confirm a plan, allowing objectors to appeal to a court. H.R. 
31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 6-204 (1975). The Judges' Bill required a judicial hearing for 
confirmation. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., !st Sess. § 6-306 (1975). A similar provision in the 
National Bankruptcy Conference proposal was described by their spokesman as "another 
concession which the National Bankruptcy Conference made to the judges." Testimony of 
George M. Treister, Vice Chairman, National Bankruptcy Conference, before the House 
Judiciary Subcommittee, Bankruptcy Act Revision, Part I, supra note 3, at 595. 
93 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., !st Sess. § 1325(a)(4) (1977). Debtors have the right to modify 
their proposals before confirmation. H.R. 8200, § 1323. 
94 Earlier research revealed that successful wage earners' plans yield 90% payment to 
unsecured creditors and that even cases ultimately dismissed yield 19%. D. STANLEY & M. 
GIRTH, supra note 7, at 102. By contrast, straight bankruptcy is a very bleak alternative, 
with payments to unsecured creditors occurring in less than 15% of the cases and amounting 
to only seven cents on the dollar. Id., at 92-93. 
95 See notes 44-51 and accompanying text supra. 
96 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1329(a) (1977). The Judges' Bill had more closely 
reflected the economic reality for creditors by allowing modifications without notice unless 
the modification converted an extension plan to a composition which would pay creditors 
less than 100%. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6-307 (1975). 
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opportunity for a hearing. 97 If individual notice is sent to each creditor for 
every modification, the practice under H.R. 8200 will be much different 
and more costly than the practice used in the Buffalo cases. Moreover, if 
such notices are sent and no creditors request hearings, the additional 
costs will not be offset by any perceptible benefit to creditors. On the 
other hand, without such notices the opportunity for a hearing becomes 
meaningless, unless the notice requirement is creatively interpreted. For 
example, the confirmation order might provide that a reduced check or 
missed payment constitutes notice of a modification which would entitle 
the creditor to request a hearing. Alternatively, creditors might be asked 
to waive their rights to notice as long as the modified plan did not exceed 
the maximum time period allowed under the statute. 98 
When a debtor seeks a discharge after a payment plan has been con-
firmed, creditors might have slightly more incentive to request a hearing, 
because an inappropriately granted discharge could deprive them of pos-
sible payments. The statutory procedures, which again allow judges to 
maintain control by granting a discharge after notice and a hearing, 99 are 
more consistent with creditors' economic interests in these cases than 
they are when continued payments are possible. Creditors' participation 
is not essential, however, because the judge cannot discharge the debtor 
without assessing the comparative value of payments to unsecured cred-
itors if straight bankruptcy had been chosen. 100 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF MAXIMIZING JUDICIAL CONTROL 
To date, the bankruptcy reform process has placed higher priority on 
maintaining judicial control than on reflecting the economic interests of 
creditors who are receiving payments from consumer debtors in a court-
administered plan. Future bankruptcy judges will administer payment 
plans for debtors with regular income under the proposed Bankruptcy Act 
in ways which greatly resemble the current wage earners' plans, and the 
amount of creditor repayments will not be affected significantly. Debtors 
will contine to pay as much as their vulnerable circumstances permit if 
they wish to have consumer credit available for future use. Creditors will 
continue to waive their opportunities to participate, because participation 
97 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(1) (1977). 
98 See notes 102-103 and accompanying text infra. 
99 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 138_2(b) (1977). By requiring only an opportunity for a 
hearing in§ 102(1), this legislation is closer to the Commission Bill, H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 6-207(2) (1975), than to the Judges' Bill, H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6-501(2) 
(1975), which required a hearing in each instance. 
100 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1328(b)(2) (1977). A debtor can also convert 
proceedings to straight bankruptcy at any time. § 1307(a). The court may also convert the 
case or dismiss it without a hearing, upon a finding that such a decision is in the best 
interests of creditors. § 1307(c) and (e). A dismissal would leave the debtor subject to 
creditors' collection efforts, and a conversion would allow creditors to participate in straight 
bankruptcy proceedings. Unless the debtors' nonexempt assets are substantial, either con-
version or dismissal will mean no further payments to unsecured creditors. H.R. 8200 
provides specific exemptions and allows the debtor to choose between those specified and 
those available underother state, federal, or local laws. 95th Cong., lst Sess. § 522(b) (1977). 
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usually only increases their costs without increasing their receipts. Judges 
may even dispense with required formalities when creditors systemati-
cally fail to participate in the proceedings. 
One possible exception to this pattern may occur if the notice require-
ments for postconfirmation modifications are strictly construed. 101 More 
stringent and explicit time limits for such plans might also significantly 
restrict the practice reflected in the Buffalo samples of allowing cases to 
remain open as long as any hope of further payment remains. 102 The 
statute suggests a three-year period for payments pursuant to a confirmed 
plan, although it allows a judge to extend that period to five years for 
cause. 103 Such a provision protects debtors against excessively burden-
some plans and the taxpaying public against excessive use of the federal 
courts for protracted collection cases. 
Experience with the Buffalo cases indicates that the five-year 
maximum may not appear difficult to meet at the time of confirmation. 
Debtors sometimes underestimate their obligations when they file such 
proceedings. 104 In addition, H.R. 8200 allows a debtor to obtain a straight 
bankruptcy discharge after completion of a plan paying less than 100% to 
creditors. 105 If debtors are willing to propose less than full payment, 106 
the five-year maximum will obviously be even easier to meet at confirma-
tion. 
However, the five-year maximum also applies to postconfirmation 
modifications. 107 Experience in the Buffalo cases reveals that many plans 
will have to be repeatedly revised, but that payments will be successfully 
completed within a five-year period. 108 Judges are therefore likely to 
devise varying methods of minimizing the costs of formally testing each 
modification against the statutory maximum. One possibility would be to 
include in the confirmation order a provision that the confirmed plan will 
be terminated not later than five years after performance begins. Under 
such a procedure, debtors who wish to continue to make payments 
thereafter will have to do so without the assistance of the court's staff. 
Alternatively, the confirmation order might provide that the five-year 
maximum will be deemed waived until the debtor or trustee seeks a 
discharge, dismissal, or conversion to straight bankruptcy .109 
If only minor changes occur in the administration of payment plans for 
debtors with regular income, the costs of such a legislative process may 
be calculated more in terms of opportunities missed rather than in results 
101 See notes 96-98 and accompanying text supra. 
102 See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra. 
103 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., I st Sess. § 1322(c) (1977). If additional payments are possible, 
it is unlikely that creditors will oppose a finding that inability to complete the payments 
within three years constitutes cause. 
104 See note 56 and accompanying text supra. 
105 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 727(a)(8) (1977). 
106 See note 48 and accompanying text supra. 
107 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1329(c) (1977). 
108 The longest successfully completed case took 53 months. See Table II supra. 
10
• If a primary goal of the maximum time limit is to protect the taxpaying public, such a 
provision. would be inappropriate. 
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achieved. Legislation affecting nonbusiness bankrupts could have been 
directed toward an alternative goal: successful family functioning in a 
credit-oriented society, with emphasis upon financial and family counsel-
ing. Such a goal would have required more than devising a structure 
which maximizes the control of judges and lawyers and the consistency of 
their customary formalities. 
Early in the bankrui,tcy law revision process, commentators recom-
mended that financial counseling be available as a service to bankrupts, 110 
but systematic financial counseling was not included in any of the legisla-
tive proposals. H.R. 8200 does authorize the Chapter 13 trustee'" to 
"advise, other than on legal matters and assist the debtor in performance 
under the plan." 112 Although it is impossible to estimate how extensive 
such advice will be in individual cases, the magnitude of the trustees' 
caseloads suggests that counseling is more likely to involve necessary 
modifications of payment schedules in pending proceedings than financial 
counseling aimed at future performance without court assistance. 
The failure of the bankruptcy reform proposals to include staff for 
financial counseling is consistent with a tradition of failure to deal with 
family financial functioning once civil cases have reached formal court 
proceedings. 113 Such staffing should nonetheless remain under considera-
tion for possible future statutory amendments. 114 With nonbusiness bank-
ruptcy petitions totalling nearly 200,000 per year in recent years, 115 the 
number of families operating under severe financial stress is substan-
tial.116 
110 Herrmann, Families in Bankruptcy-A Survey of Recent Studies, 28 J. MARR. & FAM. 
324, 330 (1966); D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 205. 
111 The Chapter 13 trustee can be elected by creditors or appointed by the United States 
trustee as the standing trustee for all Chapter 13 cases in the district. If neither method is 
used, the salaried United States trustee serves as the Chapter 13 trustee in addition to his 
duties in other bankruptcy cases. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1302(a) (1977). 
112 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., !st Sess. § 1302(c) (1977). However, this responsibility is not 
imposed upon creditor-elected trustees. 
113 The counseling services have been analogized to those traditionally expected of 
probation staff in federal criminal proceedings. Siporin, Bankrupt Debtors and Their 
Families, 12 Soc. WORK 51, 62 (1967). 
114 It is more understandable that financial counseling was not provided when wage 
earners' plans were first included as part of the bankruptcy revisions of 1938. Consumer 
credit was not widely available or utilized until World War II ended seven years later. An 
expanded definition of needs accompanied the possiblity of discretionary spending beyond 
subsistence levels. G. KATONA, THE MASS CONSUMPTION SOCIETY 6, 231 (1964). As a 
result, between 1945 and 1965 the consumer debt burden climbed to approximately one-fifth 
of disposable personal income before levelling off for the nine years ending in December 
1974. See Yeager, Personal Bankruptcy and Economic Stability, 41 S. EcoN. J. 96, 100 
(1974). Prof. Yeager defined the consumer debt burden as the proportion of consumer credit 
outstanding to disposable personal income. His calculations were updated by the author. 
115 See TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 14, at Table F3, for the respec-
tive fiscal years. 
116 Such stress may be especially intense for the working-class families who are predo-
minant among the petitioners for wage earners' plans, because they are vulnerable to income 
fluctuations resulting from cutbacks in overtime or layoffs. Schneiderman, The Practical 
and Cultural Significance of Money, 23 Pue. WELFARE 197, 198 (1965); Hurvitz, Marital 
Strain in the Blue Collar Family, in A. SHOSTAK & w. GOMBERG, BLUE COLLAR WORLD 93, 
IOI (1964). 
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The impact of financial stress on family functioning is pervasive. 117 For 
this reason, some bankruptcy judges have undertaken experiments with 
more extensive family counseling and referrals. They report that it is 
possible to make existing social services available to nonbusiness peti-
tioners in a bankruptcy setting. 118 By allowing status politics and appeals 
for procedural consistency to predominate in the current bankruptcy 
revisions, we have missed the opportunity to systematize the availability 
of counseling and to reduce societal costs over the longer term. 
Such costs are diffuse and hard to estimate, and it is difficult to per-
suade Congress to accept staffing to facilitate cost-prevention in a bank-
ruptcy context. If bankruptcy judges are willing to continue to improvise 
such programs, however, a later proposal to add staff to provide financial 
counseling and to coordinate referrals to available social services may be 
successful. 
117 Money management problems emerge as a significant cause of interspousal hostility, 
alienation, or avoidance. Krupinski, Marshall, & Yule, Patterns of Marital Problems in 
Marriage Guidance Clinics, 32 J. MARR. & FAM. 138-42 (1970). Wives, who typically 
controlled expenditures in blue-collar families, reported absolute discontent with their finan-
cial status. L. RAINWATER, R. COLEMAN & G. HANDEL, WORKINGMAN'S WIFE 82, 145 
(1959). These families often engage in compensatory consumption as a substitute for blocked 
social mobility. Caplovitz, The Problems of Blue Collar Consumers, in A. SHOSTAK & W. 
GOMBERG, supra note 116, at 110. 
118 These data were also ignored by the legislators who were revising the statute. Ander-
son, A Digest of Broader Persectivesfor Bankruptcy Court Reform, 81 COM. L. J. 240, 241 
(1976); Cyr, Setting the Record Straight for a Comprehensive Revision of the Bankruptcy 
Act of /898, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 155-56 (1975). 

